But as an hunter maketh wild beasts his prey, and useth toils, nets, snares, traps, dogs, ferrets, mining and digging the ground, guns, bows, spears, and all other instruments, engines, devises, subtleties, and means, whereby he may come by his prey: so doth a wicked governor make the people his game and prey, and useth all kinds of subtleties, deceits, crafts, policies, force, violence, cruelty and such like devilish ways, to spoil and destroy the people, that be committed to his charge.

Now for as much as there is no express positive law for punishment of a Tyrant among Christian men, the question is, whether it be lawful to kill such a monster and cruel beast covered with the shape of a man. . . . England lacketh not the practice and experience of the same. For they deprived King Edward the second, because without law he killed his subjects, spoiled them of their goods, and wasted the treasure of the realm. And upon what just cause Richard the second was thrust out, and Henry the fourth put in his place, I refer it to their own judgment.

And seeing it is before manifestly and sufficiently proved, that kings and princes have not an absolute power over their subjects: that they are and ought to be subject to the law of God, and the wholesome positive laws of their country, and that they may not lawfully take or use their subjects' goods at their pleasure: the reasons, arguments and law that serve for the deposing and displacing of an evil governor, will do as much for the proof, that it is lawful to kill a tyrant, if they may be indifferently heard. As God hath ordained Magistrates to hear and determine private men's matters, and to punish their vices, so also will he, that the magistrates' doings be called to account and reckoning, and their vices corrected and punished by the body of the whole congregation or commonwealth. . . . For it is no private law to a few or certain people, but common to all: not written in books, but graffed in the hearts of men; not made by man, but ordained of God, which we have not learned, received or read, but have taken, sucked and drawn it out of nature, whereunto we are not taught, but made, not instructed, but seasoned, and (as S[aint] Paul saith) man's conscience bearing witness of it.

This law testifieth to every man's conscience, that it is natural to cut away an incurable member, which (being suffered) would destroy the whole body. . . . Kings, Princes and other governors, albeit they are the heads of a politic body, yet they are not the whole body. And though they be the chief members, yet they are but members: neither are the people ordained for them, but they are ordained for the people. . . .

But I beseech thee, what needeth to make one general law to punish by one name a great many offenses, when the law is already made for the punishment of every one of them particularly? If a prince rob and spoil his subjects, it is theft, and as a thief he ought to be punished. If he kill and murder them contrary or without the laws of his country, it is murder, and as a murderer he ought to be punished. If he commit adultery, he is an adulterer and ought to be punished with the same pains that others be. If he violently ravish men's wives, daughters, or maidens, the laws that are made against ravishers ought to be executed on him. If he go about to betray his country, and to bring the people under a foreign power, he is a traitor, and as a traitor he ought to suffer. . . . Fear no man, for ye execute the judgment of God, saith the holy ghost by the mouth of Moses. Judge not after the outward appearance of men, but judge rightly, saith Christ.

When kings or rulers become blasphemers of God, oppressors and murderers of their subjects, they ought no more to be accounted kings or lawful magistrates, but as private men to be examined, accused, condemned and punished by the law of God, and being condemned and punished by that law, it is not man's but God's doing . . . When magistrates cease to do their duty, the people are as it were without magistrates . . . If princes do right and keep promise with you, then do you owe them all humble obedience. If not, ye are discharged and your study ought to be in this case how ye may depose and punish according to the law such rebels against God and oppressors of their country.

There are many princes in these days calling themselves Christians which arrogantly assume an unlimited power over which God himself hath no command, and . . . they have no want of flatterers which adore them as gods upon earth . . . The princes exceed their bounds, not contenting themselves with that authority which the almighty and all good God hath given them, but seek to usurp that sovereignty which He hath reserved to Himself over all men, being not content to command the bodies and goods of their subjects at their pleasure, but assume license to themselves to enforce the consciences, which appertains chiefly to Jesus Christ. Holding the earth not great enough for their ambition, they will climb and conquer heaven itself. The people, on the other side . . . instead of resisting them, if they have means and occasion, suffer them to usurp the place of God, making no conscience to give that to Caesar which belongs properly and only to God. . . .

It then belongs to princes to know how far they may extend their authority, and to subjects in what they may obey them, if subjects be bound to obey kings in case they command that which is against the law of God: that is to say, to which of the two (God or king) must we rather obey?

First, the Holy Scripture doth teach that God reigns by His own proper authority, and kings by derivation; God from Himself, kings from God; that God hath a jurisdiction proper, kings are His delegates. It follows then that the jurisdiction of God hath no limits, that of kings is bounded; that the power of God is infinite, that of kings confined; that the kingdom of God extends itself to all places, that of kings is restrained within the confines of certain countries. In like manner God hath created of nothing both heaven and earth, wherefore by good right He is lord and true proprietor . . . and all men, of what degree or quality soever they be, are His servants, farmers, officers, and vassals, and owe account and acknowledgment to Him.

God does not at any time divest Himself of His power. He holds a scepter in one hand to repress and quell the audacious boldness of those princes who mutiny against Him, and in the other a balance to control those who administer not justice with equity as they ought. . . . Therefore all kings are the vassals of the King of Kings, invested into their office by the sword, which is the cognizance of their royal authority, to the end that with the sword they maintain the law of God, defend the good, and punish the evil. . . .

Now if we consider what is the duty of vassals, we shall find that what may be said of them agrees properly to kings. . . . The vassal receives laws and conditions from his sovereign. God commands the king to observe his laws and to have them always before his eyes, promising that he and his successors shall possess long the kingdom if they be obedient, and, on the contrary, that their reign shall be of small continuance if they prove rebellious to their sovereign king. . . . The vassal loses his fee [fief] if he commit a felony, and by law forfeits all his privileges. In the like case the king loses his right, and many times his realm also, if he despise God, if he complot with His enemies, and if he commit felony against that royal majesty. This will appear more clearly by the consideration of the covenant which is contracted between God and the king, for God does that honor to His servants to call them His confederates. Now we read of two sorts of covenants at the inaugurating of kings: the first between God, the king, and the people, that the people might be the people of God; the second between the king and the people, that the people shall obey faithfully and the king command justly. . . . If a prince usurps the right of God, and puts himself forward, after the manner of the giants, to scale the heavens, he is no less guilty of high treason to his sovereign, and commits felony in the same manner as if one of his vassals should seize on the rights of his crown, and puts himself into evident danger to be despoiled of his estates; and that so much the more justly, there being no proportion between God and an earthly king, between the Almighty and a mortal man, whereas yet between the lord and the vassal there is some relation of proportion. . . . kings are the vassals of God and deserve to be deprived of the benefit they receive from their lord if they commit felony, in the same fashion as rebellious vassals are of their estates. These premises being allowed, this question may be easily resolved; for if God hold the place of sovereign lord, and the king as vassal, who dare deny but that we must rather obey the sovereign than the vassal? If God commands one thing and the king commands the contrary, what is that proud man that would term him a rebel who refuses to obey the king, when else he must disobey God?

The Second Question: Whether It Be Lawful to Resist a Prince Who Doth Infringe the Law of God or Ruin His Church? By Whom, How, and How Far Is It Lawful?

The question is, if it be lawful to resist a prince violating the law of God, or ruinating the church, or hindering the restoring of it? If we hold ourselves to the tenure of the Holy Scripture it will resolve us. For if in this case it had been lawful to the Jewish people (the which may be easily gathered from the books of the Old Testament), yea, if it had been enjoined them, I believe it will not be denied that the same must be allowed to the whole people of any Christian kingdom or country whatsoever...

But I see well, here will be an objection made. What will you say? That a whole people, that beast of many heads, must they run in a mutinous disorder to order the business of the commonwealth? What address or direction is there in an unruly and unbridled multitude? What counsel or wisdom to manage the affairs of state?

When we speak of all the people we understand by that only those who hold their authority from the people: to wit, the magistrates, who are inferior to the king, and whom the people have substituted or established, as it were, consorts in the empire and with a kind of tribunitial authority to restrain the encroachments of sovereignty and to represent the whole body of the people. as it is lawful for a whole people to resist and oppose tyranny, so likewise the principal persons of the kingdom may, as heads and for the good of the whole body, confederate and associate themselves together. And as in a public state that which is done by the greatest part is esteemed and taken as the act of all, so in like manner must it be said to be done which the better part of the most principal have acted-briefly, that all the people had their hand in it.

Briefly, for so much as none were ever born with crowns on their heads and scepters in their hands, and that no man can be a king by himself, no reign without people“whereas, on the contrary, the people may subsist of themselves, and were long before they had any kings“it must of necessity follow that kings were at the first constituted by the people. And although the sons and dependents of such kings, inheriting their fathers' virtues, may in a sort seem to have rendered their kingdoms hereditary to their offsprings, and that in some kingdoms and countries the right of free election seems in a sort buried, yet notwithstanding, in all well-ordered kingdoms this custom is yet remaining. The sons do not succeed the fathers before the people have first, as it were, anew established them by their new approbation. Neither were they acknowledged in quality as inheriting it from the dead, but approved and accounted kings then only when they were invested with the kingdom by receiving the scepter and diadem from the hands of those who represent the majesty of the people.

If it be objected that kings were enthronised and received their authority from the people who lived five hundred years ago, and not by those now living, I answer that the commonwealth never dies, although kings be taken out of this life one after another. For as the continual running of the water gives the river a perpetual being, so the alternative revolution of birth and death renders the people immortal. The only duty of kings and emperors is to provide for the people' good. The kingly dignity, to speak properly, is not a tide of honor but a weighty and burdensome office. It is not a discharge or vacation from affairs to run a licentious course of liberty, but a charge and vocation to all industrious employments for the service of the commonwealth.

When therefore that these words of mine and thine entered into the world, and that differences fell amongst fellow citizens touching the propriety of goods, and wars amongst neighboring people about the right of their confines, the people bethought themselves to have recourse to someone who both could and should take order that the poor were not oppressed by the rich, nor the patriots wronged by strangers. . . . Seeing then that kings are ordained by God and established by the people to procure and provide for the good of those who are committed unto them, and that this good or profit be principally expressed in two things, to wit, in the administration of justice to their subjects and in the managing of armies for the repulsing their enemies“certainly we must infer and conclude from this that the prince who applied himself to nothing but his peculiar profits and pleasures, or to those ends which most readily conduce thereunto; who contemns and perverts all laws; who uses his subjects more cruelly than the barbarous enemy would do: he may truly and really be called a tyrant and those who in this manner govern their kingdoms, be they of never so large an extent, are more properly unjust pillagers and freebooters than lawful governors.

. . . Thus became rebellion, as you see, both the first and the greatest, and the very first of all other sins, and the first and principal cause, both of all worldly and bodily miseries, sorrows, diseases, sicknesses, and deaths, and which is infinitely worse then all these, as is said, the very cause of death and damnation eternal also. After this breach of obedience to God, and rebellion against his Majesty, all mischiefs and miseries breaking in therewith, and overflowing the world, lest all things should come unto confusion and utter ruin, God forthwith by laws given unto mankind, repaired again the rule and order of obedience thus by rebellion overthrown, and besides the obedience due unto his Majesty, he not only ordained that in families and households, the wife should be obedient unto her husband, the children unto their parents, the servants unto their masters: but also, when mankind increased, and spread itself more largely over the world, bee by his holy word did constitute and ordain in Cities and Countries several and special governors and rulers, unto whom the residue of his people should be obedient.

As in reading of the Holy Scriptures, we shall find . . . that Kings and Princes, as well the evil as the good, do reign by God's ordinance, and that subjects are bounden to obey them: that God doth give Princes wisdom, great power, and authority: that God defendeth them against their enemies, and destroyeth their enemies horribly: that the anger and displeasure of the Prince, is as the roaring of a lion, and the very messenger of death: and that the subject that provoketh him to displeasure, sinneth against his own soul: . . . Kings, Queens, and other Princes (for he speaketh of authority and power, be it in men or women) are ordained of God, are to be obeyed and honored of their subjects: that such subjects, as are disobedient or rebellious against their Princes, disobey God, and procure their own damnation: that the government of Princes is a great blessing of God, given for the common wealth, specially of the good and godly: for the comfort and cherishing of whom God giveth and setteth by princes: and on the contrary part, to the fear and for the punishment of the evil and wicked.

. . . It cometh therefore neither of chance and fortune (as they term it) nor of the ambition of mortal men and women climbing up of their own accord to dominion, that there bee Kings, Queens, Princes, and other governors over men being their subjects: but all Kings, Queens, and other governors are specially appointed by the ordinance of God. . . . so hath he constituted, ordained and set earthly Princes over particular Kingdoms and Dominions in earth, both for the avoiding of all confusion, which else would be in the world, if it should be without governors, and for the great quiet and benefit of earthly men their subjects.

What shall subjects do then? shall they obey valiant, stout, wise, and good princes, and contemn, disobey, and rebel against children being their princes, or against undiscreet and evil governors? God forbid: for first what a perilous thing were it to commit unto the subjects the judgment which prince is wise and godly, and his government good, and which is otherwise: as though the foot must judge of the head: an enterprise very heinous, and must needs breed rebellion. For who else be they that are most inclined to rebellion, but such haughty spirits? from whom springeth such foul ruin of Realms? Is not rebellion the greatest of all mischiefs? And who are most ready to the greatest mischiefs, but the worst men? . . . a rebel is worse than the worst prince, and rebellion worse than the worst government of the worst prince that hitherto hath been: both rebels are unmeet ministers, and rebellion an unfit and unwholesome medicine to reform any small lacks in a prince, or to cure any little griefs in government . . . Shall the subjects both by their wickedness provoke God for their deserved punishment, to give them an undiscreet or evil prince, and also rebel against him, and withal against God, who for the punishment of their sins did give them such a prince? Will you hear the Scriptures concerning this point? God (say the holy Scriptures)' maketh a wicked man to reign for the sins of the people. Again, God giveth a prince in his anger, meaning an evil one, and taketh away a prince in his displeasure, meaning specially when he taketh away a good prince for the sins of the people. . . . Here you see, that God placeth as well evil Princes as good.

We have said that this power ought to be perpetual, for that it may be that at that absolute power over the subjects may be given to one or many, for a short or certain time; which expired, they are no more than subjects themselves. So that whilst they are in their puissant authority, they cannot call themselves sovereign princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this sovereign power, until it shall please the people or the prince that gave it them to recall it, who always remained seized [in possession] thereof. For as they which lend or pawn unto another man their goods remain still the lords and owners thereof, so it is also with them who give unto others power and authority to judge and command, be it for a certain time limited or so great and long time as shall please them“they themselves nevertheless continuing still seized of the power and jurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loan or borrowing....

But let us grant an absolute power, without appeal or controlment, to be granted by the people to one or many, to manage their estate and entire government. Shall we therefore say him or them to have the state of sovereignty, whenas he only is to be called absolute sovereign who next unto God acknowledgeth none greater than himself? Wherefore I say no sovereignty to be in them, but in the people, of whom they have a borrowed power, or power for a certain time; which once expired, they are bound to yield up their authority. Neither is the people to be thought to have deprived itself of the power thereof, although it have given an absolute power to one or more for a certain time: and much more if the power (be it given) be revocable at the pleasure of the people, without any limitation of time. For both the one and the other hold nothing of themselves, but are to give account of their doings unto the prince or the people of whom they had the power to command. Whereas the prince or people themselves, in whom the sovereignty resteth, are to give account unto none but to the immortal God alone. . . .

Now let us prosecute the other part of our propounded definition, and show what these words absolute power signify. For we said that unto majesty, or sovereignty, belongeth an absolute power not subject to any law. For the people or the lords of a commonweal may purely and simply give the sovereign and perpetual power to anyone, to dispose of the goods and lives and of all the state at his pleasure, and so afterward to leave it to whom he list; like as the proprietor or owner may purely and simply give his own goods, without any other cause to be expressed than of his own mere bounty“which is indeed the true donation, which no more receiveth condition, being once accomplished and perfected. As for the other donations, which carry with them charge and conditions, [they] are not indeed true donations. So also the chief power, given unto a prince with charge and condition, is not properly sovereignty, nor power absolute except that such charge or condition annexed unto the sovereignty at the creation of a prince be directly comprehended within the laws of God and nature. . . .

If we shall say that he only hath absolute power which is subject unto no law, there should then be no sovereign prince in the world, seeing that all princes of the earth are subject unto the laws of God, of nature, and of nations. . . . But it behoveth him that is a sovereign not to be in any sort subject to the command of another. . . . [His] office it is to give laws unto his subjects, to abrogate laws unprofitable, and in their stead to establish other; which he cannot do that is himself subject unto laws, or to others which have command over him. And that is it for which the law saith that the prince is acquitted from the power of the laws. And this word, the law, in the Latin importeth the commandment of him which hath the sovereignty. . . . If then the sovereign prince be exempted from the laws of his predecessors, much less should he be bound unto the laws and ordinances he maketh himself. For a man may well receive a law from another man, but impossible it is in nature for to give a law unto himself, no more than it is to command a man's self in a matter depending of his own will. . . . And as the pope can never bind his own hands (as the canonists say), so neither can a sovereign prince bind his own hands, albeit that he would. We see also in the end of all edicts and laws these words, Quia sic nobis placuit, "Because it hath so pleased us"; to give us to understand that the laws of a sovereign prince, although they be grounded upon good and lively reasons, depend nevertheless upon nothing but his mere and frank goodwill.

But as for the laws of God and nature, all princes and people of the world are unto them subject. Neither is it in their power to impugn them, if [they] will not be guilty of high treason to the divine majesty, making war against God, under the greatness of whom all monarchs of the world ought to bear the yoke and to bow their heads in all fear and reverence. Wherefore, in that we said the sovereign power in a commonweal to be free from all laws, [that] concerneth nothing the laws of God and nature.

I cannot use a better example than of the duty of a son towards his father. The law of God saith that he which speaketh evil of his father or mother shall be put to death. Now if the father shall be a thief, a murderer, a traitor to his country . . . or what so you will else, I confess that all the punishments that can be devised are not sufficient to punish him. Yet I say that it is not for the son to put his hand thereunto. . . . Wherefore the prince, whom you may justly call the father of the country, ought to be unto every man dearer and more reverend than any father, as one ordained and sent unto us by God. I say, therefore, that the subject is never to be suffered to attempt anything against his sovereign prince, how naughty and cruel soever he be. Lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrary unto the laws of God and nature; to fly and hide ourselves from him; but yet to suffer stripes, yea, and death also, rather than to attempt anything against his life or honor.

KING JAMES VI, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES, OR THE RECIPROCK AND MUTUAL DUTY BETWIXT A FREE KING AND HIS NATURAL SUBJECTS (1598)

It is casten up by divers that employ their pens upon apologies for rebellions and treasons, that every man is born to carry such a natural zeal and duty to his commonwealth, as to his mother, that seeing it so rent and deadly wounded as whiles it will be by wicked and tyrannous kings, good citizens will be forced, for the natural zeal and duty they owe to their own native country, to put their hand to work for freeing their commonwealth from such a pest.

Whereunto I give two answers: First, it is a sure axiom in theology, that evil should not be done that good may come of it. The wickedness, therefore, of a king can never make them that are ordained to be judged by him, to become his judges. And if it not lawful to a private man to revenge his private injury upon his private adversary (since God hath only given the sword to the magistrate), how much less is it lawful to the people, or any part of them (who all are but private men; the authority being always with the magistrate, as I have already proved), to take upon them the use of the sword whom-to it belongs not, against the public magistrate, whom-to only it belongeth.

Next, in place of relieving the commonwealth out of distress (which is their only excuse and color) they shall heap double distress and desolation upon it, and so their rebellion shall procure the contrary effects that they pretend it for. For a king cannot be imagined to be so unruly and tyrannous but the commonwealth will be kept in better order, notwithstanding thereof by him than it can be by his way-taking. For first, all sudden mutations are perilous in commonwealths, hope being thereby given to all bare men to set up themselves and fly with other men's feathers, the reins being loosed, to all the insolencies that disordered people can commit by hope of impunity because of the looseness of all things. . . .

The second objection they ground upon the curse that hangs over the commonwealth where a wicked king reigneth. And, say they, there cannot be a more acceptable deed in the sight of God, nor more dutiful to their commonweal, than to free the country of such a curse, and vindicate to them their liberty, which is natural to all creatures to crave.

Whereunto, for answer, I grant indeed that a wicked king is sent by God for a curse to his people and a plague for their sins. But that it is lawful for them to shake off that curse at their own hand which God hath laid on them, that I deny, and may do so justly. . . . Patience, earnest prayers to God, and amendment of their lives, are the only lawful means to move God to relieve them of that heavy curse. As for vindicating to themselves their own liberty, what lawful Power have they to revoke to themselves again those privileges which their own consent before, were so fully put out of their hands? For if a prince cannot justly bring back again to himself the privileges once bestowed by him or his predecessors upon any state or rank of his subjects; much may the subjects maw [i.e., rob] out of the prince's hand that superiority which and his predecessors have so long brooked over them.

The last objection is grounded upon the mutual paction and adstipulation (as they call it) betwixt the king and his people at the time of his coronation. For there, they say, there is a mutual paction and contract bound up and sworn betwixt the king and the people. . . . I confess that a king at his coronation, or at the entry to his kingdom, willingly promises to his people to discharge honorably the truly the office given him by God over them. . . . Now in this contract (I say) betwixt the king and his people, God is doubtless the only judge, both because to him only the king must make count of his administration (as is oft said before), as likewise, by the oath in the coronation God is made judge and revenger of the breakers. For in his presence, as only judge of oaths, all oaths ought to be made.

Then since God is the only judge betwixt the two parties contractors, the cognition and revenge must only appertain to him. It follows therefore of necessity that God must first give sentence upon the king that breaks, before the people can think themselves free of their oath. What justice then is it that the party shall be both judge and party, usurping upon himself the office of God, may by this argument easily appear. And shall it then lie in the hands of [the] headless multitude, when they please to weary of subjection, to cast off the yoke of government that God has laid upon them, to judge and punish him, whom-by they should be judged and punished, and in that case wherein by their violence they kythe ["declare"] themselves to be most passionate parties to use the office of an ungracious judge or arbiter?

And therefore, since it is certain that a king, in case so it should fall out that his people in one body had rebelled against him, he should not in that case, as thinking himself free of his promise and oath, become an utter enemy and practice the wreck of his whole people and native country (although he ought justly to punish the principal authors and bellows of that universal rebellion), how much less then ought the people (that are always subject unto him and naked of all authority on their part) press to judge and overthrow him? . . .

And it is here likewise to be noted that the duty and allegiance which the people swears to their prince is not only bound to themselves, but likewise to their lawful heirs and posterity, the lineal succession of crowns being begun among the people of God and happily continued in divers Christian commonwealths. So as no objection either of heresy, or whatsoever private statute or law may free the people from their oath-giving to their king and his succession [as] established by the old fundamental laws of the kingdom.

For, as he is their heritable overlord, and so by birth, not by any right in the coronation, comes to his crown, it is alike unlawful (the crown ever standing full) to displace him that succeeds thereto as to eject the former. For at the very moment of the expiring of the king reigning the nearest and lawful heir enters in his place. And so to refuse him, or intrude another, is not to hold out one coming in, but to expel and put out their righteous king.

I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant is in this: That whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant does think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites; the righteous and just king does by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and prosperity of his people, and that his greatest and principal worldly felicity must consist in their prosperity. If you be rich I cannot be poor: if you be happy I cannot but be fortunate: and I protest that your welfare shall ever be my greatest care and contentment: and that I am a servant it is most true, that as I am Head and Governor of all the people in my Dominion who are my natural vassals and subjects, considering them in numbers and distinct ranks; So if we will take the whole people as one body and mass, then as the head is ordained for the body, and not the body for the head; so must a righteous king know himself to be ordained for his people, and not his people for him.

Not that by all this former discourse of mine, and apology for kings, I mean that whatsoever errors and intolerable abominations a sovereign prince commit, he ought to escape all punishment, as if thereby the world were only ordained for kings, and they without controlment to turn it upside down at their pleasure. But by the contrary, by remitting them to God (who is their only ordinary judge) I remit them to the sorest and sharpest schoolmaster that can be devised for them, for the further a king is preferred by God above all other ranks and degrees of men, and the higher that his seat is above theirs, the greater is his obligation to his maker. And therefore in case he forget himself (his unthankfulness being in the same measure of height) the sadder and sharper will his correction be; and according to the greatness of the height he is in, the weight of his fall will recompense the same. For the further that any person is obliged to God, his offence becomes and grows so much the greater than it would be in any other. Jove's thunderclaps light oftener and sorer upon the high and stately oaks than on the low and supple willow trees, and the highest bench is slipperiest to sit upon. Neither is it ever heard that any king forgets himself towards God, or in his vocation, but God with the greatness of the plague revenges the greatness of his ingratitude. Neither think I by the force and argument of this my discourse so to persuade the people, that none will hereafter be raised up and rebel against wicked princes. But remitting to the justice and providence of God to stir up such scourges as pleases for punishment of wicked kings (who made the very vermin and filthy dust of the earth to bridle the insolency of proud Pharaoh), my only purpose and intention in this treatise is to persuade, as far as lies in me, by these sure and infallible grounds, all such good Christian readers as bear not only, the naked name of a Christian but kythe ["mainfest"] the fruits thereof in their daily form of life to keep their hearts and hands free from such monstrous and unnatural rebellions whensoever the wickedness of a prince shall procure the same at God's hands; that, when it shall please God to cast such scourges of princes and instruments of his fury, in the fire, ye may stand up with clean hands and unspotted consciences, having proved yourselves in all your actions true Christians toward God, and dutiful subjects towards your king, having remitted the judgment and punishment of all his wrongs to Him, whom to only of right it appertains.

But craving at God, and hoping that God shall continue his blessing with us in not sending such fearful desolation, I heartily wish our king's behavior so to be, and continue among us, as our God in earth and loving father, endued with such properties as I described a king in the first part of this treatise. And that ye (my dear countrymen and charitable readers) may press by all means to procure the prosperity and welfare of your king, that as he must on the one part think nil his earthly felicity, and happiness grounded upon your weal, caring more for himself for your sake than for his own, thinking himself only ordained for your weal, such holy and happy, emulation may arise betwixt him and you as his care for your quietness and your care for his honor and preservation may in all your actions daily. strive together, that the land may think themselves blessed with such a king, and the king may think himself most happy, in ruling over so loving and obedient subjects.

KING JAMES I, "A SPEECH TO THE LORDS AND COMMONS OF THE PARLIAMENT AT WHITEHALL"

The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth. For kings are not only God's lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon God's throne, but even by God Himself they are called gods. There be three principal similitudes that illustrate the state of monarchy: one taken out of the word of God, and the two other out of the grounds of policy and philosophy. In the Scriptures kings are called gods, and so their power after a certain relation compared to the divine power. Kings are also compared to fathers of families, for a king is truly Parens patriae ['father of the country"], the politic father of his people. And lastly, kings are compared to the head of this microcosm of the body of man.

Kings are justly called gods, for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth. For if you will consider the attributes to God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a king. God hath power to create, or destroy, make, or unmake at His pleasure, to give life, or send death, to judge all, and to be judged nor accountable to none; to raise low things, and to make high things low at His pleasure, and to God are both soul and body due. And the like power have kings: they make and unmake their subjects; they have power of raising, and casting down; of life, and of death; judges over all their subjects and in all causes, and yet accomptable to none but God only. They have power to exalt low things, and abase high things, and make of their subjects like men at the chess, a pawn to take a bishop or a knight, and to cry up ['praise"] or down any of their subjects, as they do their money. And to the king is due both the affection of the soul, and the service of the body of his subjects. . . .

As for the father of a family, they had of old under the law of nature Patriam potestatem ["fatherly power"], which was Potestatem vitae & necis ["power of life and death"], over their children or family (I mean such fathers of families as were the lineal heirs of those families whereof kings did originally come). For kings had their first original from them, who planted and spread themselves in colonies through the world. Now a father may dispose of his inheritance to his children at his pleasure: yea, even disinherit the eldest upon just occasions, and prefer the youngest, according to his liking: make them beggers, or rich at his pleasure; restrain, or banish out of his presence, as he finds them give cause of offense, or restore them in favor again with the penitent sinner. So may the king deal with his subjects.

And lastly, as for the head of the natural body, the head hath the power of directing all the members of the body to that use which the judgment in the head thinks most convenient. It may apply sharp cures, or cut off corrupt members, let blood in what proportion it thinks fit, and as the body may spare, but yet is all this power ordained by God Ad aedificationem, non ad destructionem ["for constructive, not destructive, use"]. For although God have power as well of destruction, as of creation or maintenance, yet will it not agree with the wisdom of God, to exercise His power in the destruction of nature, and overturning the whole frame of things, since His creatures were made, that His glory might thereby be the better expressed. So were he a foolish father that would disinherit or destroy his children without a cause, or leave off the careful education of them. And it were an idle head that would in place of physic ["medicine"] so poison or phlebotomize ["bleed"] the body as might breed a dangerous distemper or destruction thereof.

But now in these our times we are to distinguish between the state of kings in their first original, and between the state of settled kings and monarchs, that do at this time govern in civil kingdoms. For even as God, during the time of the Old Testament, spake by oracles, and wrought by miracles, yet how soon it pleased Him to settle a Church which was bought, and redeemed by the blood of His only Son Christ then was there a cessation of both, He ever after governing His people and Church within the limits of His revealed will. So in the first original of kings, whereof some had their beginning by conquest, and some by election of the people, their wills at that time served for law; yet how soon kingdoms began to be settled in civility and policy, than did kings set down their minds by laws, which are properly made by the king only; but at the rogation ["formal petition"] of the people, the king's grant being obtained thereunto. And so the king became to be Lex loquens ["a speaking law"] after a sort, binding himself by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom: tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his coronation. So as every just king in a settled kingdom is bound to observe that paction["pact"] made to his people by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge, Hereafter seedtime, and harvest, cold and beat, summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease, so long as the earth remains [Genesis 8:22]. And therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws. In which case the king's conscience may speak unto him, as the poor widow said to Philip of Macedon: either govern according to your law, Aut ne Rex sis ["or you may not be king"]. And though no Christian man ought to allow any rebellion of people against their prince, yet doth God never leave kings unpunished when they transgress these limits. For in that same Psalm where God saith to kings, Vos Dii estis ["you are gods," (Psalm 82:6)], he immediately thereafter concludes, But ye shall die like men. The higher we are placed, the greater shall our fall be ... the taller the trees be, the more in danger of the wind; and the tempest beats sorest upon the highest mountains. Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests, both against them and the commonwealth. For it is a great difference between a king's government in a settled state, and what kings in their original power might do in Individuo vago ["as a free indidivdual']. As for my part, I thank God, I have ever given good proof, that 1 never had intention to the contrary. And I am sure to go to my grave with that reputation and comfort, that never king was in all his time more careful to have his laws duly observed, and himself to govern thereafter, than I.

I conclude then this point touching the power of kings, with this axiom of divinity, that as to dispute what God may do, is blasphemy, but quid vult Deus ["what God wants"] that divines may lawfully, and do ordinarily dispute and discuss; for to dispute a posse ad esse ["from what may be to what is"] is both against logic and divinity, so is it sedition in subjects, to dispute what a king may do in the height of his power. But just kings will ever be willing to declare what they will do, if they will not incur the curse of God. I will not be content that my power be disputed upon, but I shall ever be willing to make the reason appear of all my doings, and rule my actions according to my laws.